Full English Translation on the Impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol

 

Full English Translation of the Constitutional Court’s Ruling on the Impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol

The current time is 11:22 a.m.

Ruling.
The respondent,
President Yoon Suk Yeol,
is hereby removed from office.

(April 4, 2025, at 11:22 a.m.,
shall be engraved as a moment that will be remembered in the annals of the Republic of Korea’s history.)

https://youtu.be/BO0ymSl-MzE

Moon Hyung-bae, Justice of the Constitutional Court of Korea

Herewith, we present the full text of the ruling in the impeachment case as follows.

Case No.: 2024Hun-Na8
Impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol
Constitutional adjudication case regarding the impeachment of the President
Date of final ruling: April 4, 2025
Outcome: Petition upheld (Removal from office)

Summary of Ruling
We shall now deliver the ruling in case 2024Hun-Na8 concerning the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol.

▣ First, let us examine the procedural legitimacy of the case.

1. Regarding whether the declaration of martial law in this case is subject to judicial review:
Given that the purpose of an impeachment trial is to safeguard constitutional order against violations of the Constitution and the law by high-ranking officials, the declaration of martial law—even if it requires a high-level political decision—may be subject to judicial examination concerning its constitutionality and legality.

2. Regarding the National Assembly’s passing of the impeachment motion without an investigation by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee:
The Constitution entrusts the impeachment process to legislative procedures, and the National Assembly Act leaves the committee investigation to the discretion of the Assembly. Therefore, the absence of a preliminary investigation by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee does not render the impeachment motion procedurally invalid.

3. Regarding whether the resolution of the impeachment motion violates the principle of “one-time deliberation” (il-sa-bu-ja-ui):
The National Assembly Act prohibits re-submitting a rejected motion during the same session. While the first impeachment motion against the respondent failed to reach a vote during the 418th regular session, the current impeachment motion was proposed during the 419th extraordinary session. Thus, it does not violate the principle.

Justice Jeong Hyung-sik appended a supplementary opinion stating that legislation may be needed to limit repeated submissions of impeachment motions even across different sessions.

4. Regarding whether the lifting of martial law within a short time and the absence of resulting harm nullify the legal interest to be protected:
Even though the martial law was later lifted, the grounds for impeachment had already been established at the time of its declaration. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no interest in continuing the adjudication.

5. Regarding the claim that the impeachment motion originally alleged criminal violations (e.g., rebellion) but later framed them as constitutional violations:
As long as the fundamental facts remain unchanged, withdrawing or altering the applied provisions of the law does not constitute a withdrawal or change of the grounds for impeachment and is therefore permissible without additional procedures.

The respondent argued that the impeachment motion would not have passed without including the charge related to rebellion, but this is merely hypothetical and lacks objective supporting evidence.

6. Regarding the claim that the impeachment power was abused to usurp the presidency:
Since the process of passing the impeachment motion was lawful and the respondent’s violations of the Constitution or the law were substantiated to a certain degree, it cannot be concluded that the impeachment power was abused.

Therefore, the petition for impeachment is procedurally valid.

▣ Next, we shall examine whether the respondent violated the Constitution or relevant statutes in the execution of his duties, and whether such violations are grave enough to justify his removal from office.

Let us consider each ground for impeachment in turn.

1. Regarding the declaration of martial law in this case:

According to the Constitution and the Martial Law Act, one of the substantive requirements for declaring extraordinary martial law is that there must be a state of national emergency equivalent to war or insurrection—specifically, an actual occurrence of armed conflict with an enemy or a severe disruption of social order that renders the functioning of administrative and judicial authorities significantly difficult.

The respondent claimed that a grave crisis had arisen due to the opposition party's unusual initiative to pursue impeachment, unilateral exercise of legislative authority, and attempts to cut the national budget. He argued that these actions constituted an emergency situation justifying the declaration of martial law.

Following the respondent’s inauguration and prior to the declaration of martial law, the National Assembly had introduced a total of 22 impeachment motions against high-ranking officials such as the Minister of Interior and Safety, prosecutors, the Chairman of the Korea Communications Commission, and the Chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection. This series of actions gave rise to concerns that the impeachment system was being used as a political tool to pressure the executive branch, based solely on allegations of legal violations without careful consideration of their constitutional or legal merits.

However, at the time martial law was declared, only two impeachment trials were in progress—one against a prosecutor and another against the Chairman of the Korea Communications Commission.

The legislative bills that the respondent claimed had been unilaterally passed by the opposition and were problematic had not yet taken legal effect, as the President had either exercised his veto power or withheld promulgation.

With regard to the 2025 national budget, the government was operating on the 2024 budget at the time martial law was declared. The new budget had only been passed by the Special Committee on Budget and Accounts, not by the full plenary session, and therefore could not have impacted the respondent's administration at that point in time.

Accordingly, the National Assembly’s exercise of its powers—including impeachment, legislation, and budget deliberation—cannot be seen as having created an actual emergency at the time of the martial law declaration.

Even if the Assembly’s exercise of power were considered unlawful or unjust, such circumstances should be addressed through ordinary constitutional means such as the Constitutional Court's impeachment adjudication or the President’s veto power—not through the invocation of emergency powers.

The respondent also claimed that the martial law was declared to resolve suspicions of election fraud. However, the mere existence of such suspicions does not constitute an actual emergency sufficient to justify martial law.

Moreover, the National Election Commission had publicly stated that most security vulnerabilities had been addressed before the 22nd National Assembly election. Additional measures had been implemented, such as 24-hour CCTV monitoring of early and mail-in ballot storage areas and the introduction of manual verification in the vote-counting process. These facts undermine the respondent’s justification for martial law.

Taking all of the above circumstances into account, it cannot be concluded that an objectively justifiable emergency situation existed at the time of the martial law declaration.

The Constitution and the Martial Law Act require that extraordinary martial law serve either a legitimate military necessity or a public safety purpose. However, the respondent’s claims regarding legislative obstruction and alleged election fraud are matters to be resolved through political, institutional, or judicial means—not by mobilizing military force.

The respondent argued that the martial law was merely a “warning” or an “appeal” to inform the public of the opposition’s abuse of power and the national crisis. However, such a purpose does not align with the legal grounds prescribed for declaring martial law.

Furthermore, the respondent did not stop at declaring martial law; he escalated the situation by deploying military and police forces to obstruct the exercise of the National Assembly’s constitutional authority—clearly violating the Constitution and relevant laws. Thus, the respondent’s argument of it being a symbolic or expressive action cannot be accepted.

Therefore, the declaration of martial law in this case violated the substantive requirements set forth in the Constitution and the Martial Law Act.

Cheong Hyungsik, Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Korea

Next, we examine whether the declaration of martial law fulfilled the procedural requirements.

According to the Constitution and the Martial Law Act, the declaration of martial law and the appointment of a martial law commander must undergo deliberation by the State Council.

While it is acknowledged that the respondent briefly explained the intent of the martial law declaration to the Prime Minister and nine ministers immediately beforehand, he did not explain the specific contents of the plan—including the appointment of the martial law commander—nor did he provide the other Council members with an opportunity to state their opinions. Thus, it is difficult to deem that proper deliberation took place.

In addition, the respondent declared martial law despite the Prime Minister and relevant ministers not co-signing the proclamation, and he failed to publicly announce the time and region of enforcement as well as the identity of the martial law commander. He also did not immediately notify the National Assembly. As such, the respondent violated the procedural requirements for declaring extraordinary martial law, as prescribed by the Constitution and the Martial Law Act.

2. Regarding the deployment of military and police forces to the National Assembly:

The respondent instructed the Minister of National Defense to deploy troops to the National Assembly. Accordingly, soldiers entered the premises using helicopters, and some even broke windows to enter the main building.

The respondent issued commands to officers, including the Commander of the Army Special Warfare Command, stating, “It appears the quorum has not been met; break down the door and drag them out.”

The respondent also contacted the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency six times and instructed him, through the martial law commander, to enforce the contents of the martial law proclamation. Following this, the Commissioner ordered complete lockdown of the National Assembly’s entrances.

As a result, some members of the National Assembly had to climb over fences to gain entry, while others were completely blocked from entering.

Meanwhile, the Minister of National Defense instructed the Director of the Defense Security Command to track the whereabouts of 14 individuals, including the Speaker of the National Assembly and leaders of various political parties, with the intent of detaining them if necessary. The respondent also called the First Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), instructing support for the Defense Security Command’s operations. In response, the Director of the Defense Security Command requested the First Deputy Director of the NIS to assist in locating these individuals.

By deploying military and police forces to restrict access to the National Assembly and issuing commands to forcibly remove legislators, the respondent obstructed the Assembly’s constitutional functions. This violated constitutional provisions granting the Assembly the authority to demand the lifting of martial law, as well as infringing upon lawmakers’ rights to deliberate and vote, and their immunity from arrest.

Additionally, by participating in efforts to locate the positions of political party leaders, the respondent violated the freedom of political party activities.

By mobilizing armed forces for political purposes to obstruct the National Assembly, the respondent caused military personnel—who are tasked with protecting the nation under the principle of political neutrality—to stand in opposition to ordinary citizens.

Thus, the respondent infringed upon the military’s constitutional neutrality and violated his constitutional duty as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

3. Regarding the issuance of the Martial Law Proclamation:

Through the martial law proclamation, the respondent prohibited the activities of the National Assembly, local councils, and political parties, thereby violating constitutional provisions that grant the Assembly the power to demand the lifting of martial law, uphold the party system, and guarantee representative democracy and the separation of powers.

By violating the provisions of the Constitution and the Martial Law Act that prescribe requirements for restricting basic rights during martial law, and by contravening the principle of judicial warrant, the respondent infringed upon the people's political rights, the right to collective action, and the freedom of occupation.

4. Regarding the search and seizure of the National Election Commission (NEC):

The respondent instructed the Minister of National Defense to dispatch military personnel to inspect the NEC’s computer systems. Troops entered the NEC headquarters, restricted access, confiscated the mobile phones of duty officers, and filmed the systems.

This constituted a warrantless search and seizure, in violation of the principle of judicial warrant, and infringed upon the independence of the NEC.

5. Regarding the attempted location tracking of legal professionals:

As previously mentioned, the respondent was involved in efforts to track individuals for potential arrest. The list of targets included recently retired Chief Justices and Supreme Court Justices.

This subjected sitting judges to the pressure of possibly being targeted by the executive branch, thereby violating the independence of the judiciary.

Now, we examine whether the respondent’s violations of law and the Constitution are of such gravity as to warrant his removal from office.

The respondent, in order to overcome the confrontation with the National Assembly, declared martial law and mobilized military and police forces to obstruct the Assembly’s constitutional functions—thereby denying the principles of popular sovereignty and democracy. He disregarded the constitutional system of governance by ordering the military to conduct searches and seizures against the National Election Commission and infringed upon the fundamental rights of the people through the issuance of the martial law proclamation.

Such actions fundamentally violate the principles of the rule of law and democratic governance, severely damaging constitutional order and posing a serious threat to the stability of the democratic republic.

It should be noted that the National Assembly was able to swiftly adopt a resolution demanding the lifting of martial law thanks to the resistance of the citizens and the restrained conduct of the military and police. However, this does not lessen the gravity of the respondent’s violations.

The powers of the President are granted solely by the Constitution. The respondent exercised the emergency powers—among the most delicate and solemn authorities—beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, thereby undermining public trust in the presidency.

Since the respondent’s inauguration, an unusually high number of impeachment motions—primarily led by the opposition party—have resulted in the suspension of authority for various high-ranking officials pending adjudication.

In 2025, for the first time in constitutional history, the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Budget and Accounts passed a budget resolution with cuts only—without any increases—and solely by the opposition party.

The respondent’s key policy initiatives could not be implemented due to opposition resistance. In many instances, the opposition unilaterally passed bills against the administration’s position, resulting in a repeated cycle of presidential vetoes and legislative re-approvals.

Amid these circumstances, the respondent may have felt a heavy burden of responsibility, perceiving that the opposition's dominance was paralyzing state affairs and seriously undermining the national interest.

While the respondent’s judgment that the Assembly’s exercise of power constituted political overreach may deserve political respect, the confrontation between the executive and legislative branches cannot be attributed to one party alone. It is, rather, a matter to be resolved through the democratic process.

Any political expression or official decision regarding such matters must occur within the bounds of democracy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

The National Assembly should have sought resolution through dialogue and compromise, founded on tolerance and restraint in its dealings with the administration—even while respecting minority opinions.

Likewise, the respondent should have regarded the National Assembly, which represents the people, as a partner in governance.

However, the respondent treated the Assembly as an entity to be excluded, which is fundamentally incompatible with democratic principles.

Even if the respondent believed that the Assembly’s actions amounted to majoritarian tyranny, he was obligated to pursue constitutional remedies designed to maintain checks and balances.

Roughly two years after his inauguration, the respondent had the opportunity to persuade the public to grant him a legislative mandate in the National Assembly election. Regardless of whether the results aligned with his expectations, he should not have attempted to disregard or override the will of the people who supported the opposition.

Nevertheless, by violating the Constitution and the law to declare martial law, the respondent resurrected the history of abuse of emergency powers, shocking the nation and plunging society, the economy, politics, and foreign affairs into chaos.

He failed in his duty to unify the nation as President for all citizens, transcending his support base to integrate the broader community.

By mobilizing military and police forces to undermine the authority of constitutional institutions and infringe upon the basic rights of the people, the respondent betrayed the constitutional duty to uphold the Constitution and gravely violated the trust of the sovereign people of the Republic of Korea.

Ultimately, the respondent’s unconstitutional and unlawful actions constitute a grave breach of the public trust and are unacceptable from the perspective of constitutional protection.

The adverse impact and consequences of the respondent’s actions on constitutional order are so serious that the benefit of protecting the Constitution through his removal from office significantly outweighs any national losses that may result from such removal.

Accordingly, by unanimous opinion of all Justices, we hereby deliver the following order.

Since this is a constitutional impeachment case, we shall verify the time of the ruling. The current time is 11:22 a.m.

Order
The respondent, President Yoon Suk Yeol, is hereby removed from office.

This concludes the ruling.